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N.N.P.U.C. Case No. DE 09-035 Exhibit No. Ht 11 Witness Pana 1

BEFORE THE

DO NOT REMO'NEW HAMPSHIRE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

Docket No. DE 09-035

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF

George J. Eckenroth

Request for Permanent Delivery Rates

June 30, 2009

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Attachment GJE - 1	George J. Eckenroth, Background and Experience
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I. **INTRODUCTION**

2	Q.	Please state your name, position, and business address.
3	A.	My name is George J. Eckenroth. I am the Director of Corporate Financial Policy for
4		Northeast Utilities Service Company. I am providing this testimony on behalf of Public
5		Service Company of New Hampshire ("PSNH" or the "Company"). My business address
6		is 107 Selden Street, Berlin, Connecticut.
7	Q.	Have you previously testified before this Commission?
8	A.	Yes. I have testified on numerous occasions before this Commission. A list of my
9		background and experience is attached as Attachment GJE - 1.
10	Q.	What is the purpose of your testimony?
11	А.	The purpose of this testimony is (1) to describe current capital market conditions as they
12		pertain to companies in general and to electric utilities in particular; (2) discuss PSNH's
13		financial condition; (3) recommend an appropriate capital structure for PSNH; and (4)
14		recommend an overall rate of return ("ROR"), also known as a Weighted Average Cost
15		of Capital ("WACC"), for PSNH that reflects the cost of capital for each component of its
16		distribution ratemaking capitalization.

II. **SUMMARY** 17

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Please summarize your testimony.

19 The United States economy, as well as the global economy in general, is in a period of 20 A. extraordinary instability. These conditions have resulted in exceptionally high risk 21 aversion by investors, which is reflected in historically high risk premiums on both debt 22 and equity. These high risk premiums have raised the cost of capital for all companies, 23

including electric utilities. Meanwhile, PSNH's credit metrics have been weakening to a
 degree that has provoked published comments by the major rating agencies. Further, the
 rating agencies, which have been criticized for their laxness that may have contributed to
 the current credit crisis, undoubtedly will be stricter in some of their practices in the
 future.

6 In order to ensure that PSNH has access to the financial markets under these conditions, 7 certain steps are needed. First, PSNH's ratemaking capital structure needs to be 8 strengthened. Second, PSNH needs an allowed return on equity ("ROE") that is 9 consistent with the current requirements of investors. Third, PSNH needs rates that are 10 set at a level that permits PSNH a realistic opportunity to earn its allowed ROE over the 11 period that new rates will be in affect.

12 I have utilized three well-established methods to estimate the appropriate allowed ROE for PSNH. Each of these methods supports an ROE well in excess of 11 percent. I 13 recognize, however, that a sharp increase in allowed ROE may be problematic to PSNH's 14 15 customers under current challenging economic conditions. Further, allowed ROEs in recent regulatory decisions around the country have averaged closer to 10.5 percent. For 16 17 that reason, I am recommending a 10.5 percent allowed ROE rather than the 11.5 percent or higher ROE that my analyses would fully support. With a 10.5 percent ROE and my 18 recommended capital structure, PSNH's appropriate WACC is 8.11 percent. 19

Proposed Ratemaking Capital Structure and the Weighted Cost of Capital

		Cost		
	<u>Ratio</u>	Embedded	Weighted	
Long-Term Debt	48.88%	5.61%	2.74%	
Common Equity	51.12%	10.50%	<u>5.37%</u> 8.11%	

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III. CURRENT MARKET CONDITIONS

Q. Please describe current capital market conditions and their effects on the cost of capital

A. Security prices have declined severely as we have faced the most serious credit crisis
since the 1930s. The debt and equity markets remain extremely volatile due to the
ongoing financial crisis and the economic downturn. Investors remain apprehensive
about committing long-term capital.

This can be seen most clearly with the use of a risk premium-type model. Using such a 8 9 model, the cost of debt will equal a benchmark interest rate, such as the yield on 30-year 10 treasury bonds, plus a risk premium or "credit spread" to compensate investors for the 11 incremental risk of corporate securities relative to those issued by the U.S. government. 12 The table below shows that the credit spread on BBB/Baa bonds has increased from 133 13 basis points in May 2007 to 425 basis points as of May 2009. Over the same period, 30year Treasury bonds yields have decreased only 67 basis points. This 292 basis point 14 increase in the credit spread greatly outweighed the 67 basis point decline in treasury 15 yields, resulting in a net increase in the cost of debt of 225 basis points. 16

			Basis Point
	<u>May-07</u>	<u>May-09</u>	Change
30-year Treasury Yields ¹	4.90%	4.23%	-67
Bond spreads for BBB/Baa rated utility bond	1.33%	4.25%	292
All-in Bond Yields ²	6.23%	8.48%	225

Source: ¹Federal Reserve Statistical Release H15

² Mergent Bond Record for May '07and Barclays Capital for May '09


1		It is evident from this data that intensified concerns about risks in the capital markets
2		have triggered an increase in the credit spreads and confirms that investors have
3		reassessed their tolerance for risk. As Standard & Poor's ("S&P") observed in December
4		2008:
5 6 7 8 9 10 11		The Standard & Poor's composite spreads widened to new five-year highs yesterday, leaving the investment-grade spread at 554 basis points (bps) and the speculative grade spread at 1,598 bps, both well more than triple their five-year moving averages [W]ith speculative-grade defaults on the rise, a higher preponderance of credit downgrades, and a general malaise about the future of the economy, we expect spreads to remain at their elevated levels for some time until confidence is restored to the market. ¹
12		It is apparent that investors have not recovered, either financially or psychologically,
13		from the effects of the financial crisis, and may not recover for many years to come.
14 15 16 17 18	Q. A.	Have equity risk premiums increased along with the increase in credit spreads? Yes. In order to invest in common stock, investors require a substantial risk premium over and above the return on debt as compensation for the incremental risk of equity relative to debt. For this reason, the cost of equity has undergone an increase similar to the increase in the cost of debt. The relationship between the cost of debt and the cost of equity is addressed in more detail below in the sections covering the Capital Asset
19		equity is addressed in more detail below in the sections covering the Capital Asset
20		Pricing Model and Risk Premium Model.

Q. Do these higher risk premiums in the capital markets affect utilities in the same way
as they affect other companies?

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¹ Standard & Poor's Corporation, "Credit Trends: U. S. Composite Credit Spreads Daily", RatingsDirect (Dec. 2, 2008).

A. Yes, the effects on utilities have been very similar to those of other types of companies.
 As shown in the graph below, utilities face significantly higher costs of debt due to the
 higher credit spreads they now must pay relative to treasury bonds.²



4 Commenting in December 2008, S&P confirmed this trend, stating that:

Regulated electric issuers continued to access debt markets during the fourth quarter of 2008 at rates in line with the 10-year average of about 8% for five-year notes, not the abnormally low interest rate environment of the 2000's which is a distant memory.³

9 As noted above, because an equity risk premium must be added to the higher cost of debt,

10 the cost of equity has also increased sharply. In fact, a Managing Director with Fitch

11 Ratings ("Fitch") observed that with debt costs at present levels, "significantly

higher regulated returns will be required to attract equity capital."⁴ Fitch

13 concluded:

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14The collapse in secondary market debt pricing and in equity valuations is15worrisome. We see new debt now priced at around 9% or higher pushing

² Monthly utility yields are from Mergents Bond Record, except May 2009 provided by Barclays Capital. The Treasury rates are from Federal Reserve, www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm.

³ Standard & Poor's Corporation, "Industry Report Card: U. S. Electric Utility Credit Quality Remains Strong Amid Continuing Economic Downturn," RatingsDirect (Dec. 19, 2008).

⁴ Fitch Ratings Ltd., "EEI 2008 Wrap-Up: Cost of Capital Rising", Global Power North America Special Report (Nov. 17, 2008).

1	up against average authorized ROEs for utilities of around 10.25% to
2	10.50%. 5

3	Q.	Are these conditions expected to continue into the foreseeable future?
4	А.	Yes. It is clear that the events since September 2008 have undoubtedly marked a
5		significant transition in investors' expectations and there is very little indication that the
6		conditions confronting the economy and financial markets will be resolved quickly. As
7		Fitch recently concluded, "higher corporate interest rates are likely to prevail through
8		2009 and into the foreseeable future. Moreover, the fact that market volatility may
9		complicate the evaluation of the cost of equity provides no basis to ignore the upward
10		shift in investors' risk perceptions and required rates of return for long-term capital." ⁶
11	Q.	Will these capital market conditions also affect utilities' access to the capital and
11 12	Q.	Will these capital market conditions also affect utilities' access to the capital and credit markets?
	Q. A.	
12		credit markets?
12 13		credit markets? Possibly. An October 1, 2008, Wall Street Journal report confirmed that dislocations in credit markets were impacting the utility sector: Disruptions in credit markets are jolting the capital-hungry utility sector,
12 13 14 15 16		 credit markets? Possibly. An October 1, 2008, Wall Street Journal report confirmed that dislocations in credit markets were impacting the utility sector: Disruptions in credit markets are jolting the capital-hungry utility sector, forcing companies to delay new borrowing or come up with different-
12 13 14 15 16 17		credit markets? Possibly. An October 1, 2008, Wall Street Journal report confirmed that dislocations in credit markets were impacting the utility sector: Disruptions in credit markets are jolting the capital-hungry utility sector,
12 13 14 15 16		 credit markets? Possibly. An October 1, 2008, Wall Street Journal report confirmed that dislocations in credit markets were impacting the utility sector: Disruptions in credit markets are jolting the capital-hungry utility sector, forcing companies to delay new borrowing or come up with different-

⁵ Fitch Ratings Ltd., "Investing In An Unpredictable World", Fitch Ratings' 20th Annual Global Power Breakfast" (Nov. 10, 2008).

⁶ Grabelsky, Glen, "Surviving the Present, Preparing for the Future", Fitch Ratings' 20th annual Global Power Breakfast (Nov 10, 2008).

⁷ Wall Street Journal "Turmoil in Credit Markets Send Jolt to Utility (Oct. 1, 2008).

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IV. PSNH'S FINANCIAL CONDITION

Q. Please describe conditions in the electric utility industry.

3	А.	Over the last decade and a half, investors have witnessed steady erosion in credit quality
4		throughout the utility industry, both as a result of perceptions of higher risks in the
5		industry and the weakened financial conditions of the utilities themselves. Edison
6		Electric Institute ("EEI") has reported that at the beginning of 1992, the majority of
7		electric utilities were rated A (67 percent rated A, 32 percent rated BBB) but by the end
8		of 2008, most electric utilities were rated BBB (19 percent rated A, 71 percent rated
9		BBB). ⁸ Most electric utilities are only one notch away from falling below investment
10		grade. ⁹

11More recently, since the settlement of PSNH's previous rate case, investor concerns have12been deepening. The rating agencies and investors are well-aware of the financial and13regulatory pressures associated with the need to undertake significant capital investments14for electric utility infrastructure. In August 2007, Moody's observed:15[T]here are concerns arising from the sectors' sizable intrastate16investment plans in the face of an environment of steadily rising17operating costs.

⁸ www.eei.org/whatwedo/DataAnalysis/IndusFinanAnalysis/Pages/FinancialReview.aspx; Go the Capital Markets section, page 83.

⁹ 'AAA' and 'AA' (high credit quality) and 'A' and 'BBB' (medium credit quality) are considered investment grade. Credit ratings for bonds below these designations ('BB', 'B', 'CCC', etc.) are considered low credit quality, and are commonly referred to as non-investment grade or "junk bonds."

¹⁰ Moody's Investor Service, "Storm Clouds Gathering on the Horizon for the American Electric Utility Sector", Special Comment, August 2007.

1	In October 2007, S&P noted that "onerous construction programs," along with rising
2	operating and maintenance costs and volatile fuel costs, are a significant challenge to the
3	utility industry. ¹¹ Fitch recently concluded that the short- and long-term outlook for
4	investor-owned electric utilities is negative. ¹² Similarly, Moody's observed, "Material
5	negative bias appears to be developing over the intermediate and longer term due to
6	rapidly rising business and operating risks." ¹³ The headline in S&P's April 2009, <u>Rating</u>
7	Roundup was "Ratings Trend Turns Negative During First Quarter Of 2009 For U.S.
8	Electric Utilities."

9 It is important to recognize that these events are occurring in the midst of the worst credit 10 crisis in many decades and at a time when the three major rating agencies have been 11 severely criticized for not sounding an adequate alarm about the risks to which the 12 financial markets were subject.¹⁴ Faced with such aggressive critics, the rating agencies 13 will likely increase the intensity of their credit reviews to ensure that they will not again 14 be perceived as too lenient.

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5 Q. Do these general industry concerns apply specifically to PSNH?

A. Yes. In 2007 and 2008 PSNH incurred a total of \$407 million¹⁵ for capital expenditures.
 Its investment requirements for the period from 2009 though 2013 are forecast to be \$2.7

¹¹ Standard & Poor's Corporation, "U.S. Electric Utilities continue Their Long Shift to Stability" RatingDirect, October 23, 2007.

¹² Fitch Ratings, Ltd., "U.S. Utilities, Power and Gas 2009 Outlook," Global Power North America Special Report (Dec. 22, 2008).

¹³ Moody's Investors Service, "U. S. Electric Utility Sector," Industry Outlook January 2008.

¹⁴ See, for example, www.riskcenter.com/story.php?id=15308, Commentary – The History and Future of the Rating Agencies.

¹⁵ Northeast Utilities Combined Annual Report & Form 10K, PSNH Statement of Cash Flows; Investments in Property and Plant (millions \$): 2008 - 239, 2007 - 168.

billion.¹⁶ While providing the infrastructure necessary to meet the energy needs of
 customers is desirable, investors are aware that it imposes additional financial risks on the
 Company. As discussed below, this has contributed to the deterioration of PSNH's credit
 metrics.

Q. What credit ratings have been assigned to PSNH?

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A. PSNH's current credit ratings are as follows:¹⁷

	S&P	Moody's	Finch
Corporate Credit Rating	BBB	Baa2	BBB
First Mortgage Bonds	BBB+	Baa1	BBB+
Outlook	Stable	Stable	Stable

8 Q. How does PSNH's relative credit standing compare with others in the utility

industry?

10 A. The following table shows that PSNH's BBB Corporate Credit rating is below average:

11 85 utilities are rated higher than PSNH while only 40 are rated lower than PSNH. This

12 indicates that PSNH's credit standing is relatively weak as compared to other utilities.

13 Investors are, of course, hopeful that this proceeding will improve PSNH's financial

14 condition.

¹⁶ PSNH's 2009 - 2013 construction program (millions \$) Distribution – 560, Generation – 594, Transmission – 1,497.

¹⁷ PSNH's last credit rating change was a downgrade by S&P from BBB+ to BBB on April 14, 2004.

	Number of	
<u>Rating</u>	<u>Utilities</u>	
AA-	1	0.53%
A+	5	2.67%
А	12	6.42%
A-	32	17.11%
BBB+	35	18.72%
BBB	63	33.69%
BBB-	28	14.97%
BB+	6	3.21%
BB	3	1.60%
BB-	3	1.60%
_	187	

Source: S&P U.S. Regulated Electric Utilities, Strongest to Weakest, May 7, 2009

1	Q.	Please explain what you mean when you state that PSNH's credit standing is
2		relatively weak.
3	A.	PSNH's ratings are at the lower end of the investment grade. That is one reason why
4		PSNH has reduced flexibility to respond to challenges such as a prolonged and/or
5		worsening credit crisis. ¹⁸ Further, the rating agencies have expressly noted in published
6		reports that PSNH's credit metrics have weakened over the past several years. For
7		example, S&P's April 17, 2009 Summary of Public Service Company of New Hampshire
8		stated that PSNH's "financial profile [is] slightly weak for the rating level." In its
9		November 2008 Credit Opinion on PSNH, Moody's commented that PSNH's credit
10		metrics were "under its previous averages"; that its cash metrics had generally weakened
11	.**	since 2006; and that, going forward, Moody's expects that "the increase level of external

¹⁸ Reduced flexibility takes the form of fewer financing options, higher financing costs and, at particularly challenging times, difficulty in obtaining access to necessary funds

1		financings associated with the planned capital program will somewhat pressure credit
2		metrics." Similarly, Fitch, in its November 2008 Credit Analysis of PSNH, commented
3		that "Credit metrics have been trending downward."
4	Q.	Please expound on your statement that PSNH's credit metrics have been
5		weakening.
6	A.	The three ratios that S&P refers to as the principal ratios ¹⁹ are:
7		 Funds from Operations ("FFO") Interest Coverage
8		 FFO to Total Debt
9		 Total Debt to Total Capital
10		The FFO/Interest and FFO/Debt ratios (known as cash flow ratios) are the most
11		important ratios used by the credit rating agencies to evaluate a company's cash
12		flows and the company's ability to meet its financial obligations. The table below
13		confirms the observations of the rating agencies that PSNH's key cash flow credit
14		metrics are declining not only in absolutely terms but also relative to the industry.
15		In fact, the FFO to Total Debt ratio, for year-end 2008 ratio has alarmingly fallen
16		all the way to the bottom limit of the BBB rating range. ²⁰

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¹⁹ While the rating agencies consider many factors in determining a rating, they generally consider their methodology proprietary. For that reason, Fitch does not publicly disclose the factors that influence its ratings, and Moody's has only recently begun to do so. S&P has historically been the most open and transparent with respect to their criteria. Because of its long-standing and high degree of transparency and availability of comparative information, the NU system companies have generally relied on the S&P methodology to establish their capital structure targets.

²⁰ The Company has been told by the S&P that PSNH's will not be considered for a rating upgrade until the FFO to average debt ratio approaches 18 percent.

	2008		2007	
	<u>PSNH</u>	Industry	<u>PSNH</u>	Industry
FFO to Interest (x)	2.8	4.9	3.5	3.9
FFO to Total Debt (%)	10.09	18.00	13.52	19.70

S&P Guideline for BBB ratings	
FFO to Interest	2.0x - 3.5x
FFO to total Debt	10% - 30%

Source: Rating Trends Turn Negative During the First Quarter Of 2009 For U.S. Electric Utilities, April 14, 2009.

1 Q. What can be done to improve PSNH's deteriorating credit metrics?

2 A. As shown in the table below, PSNH's low and declining distribution return on equity has

3 contributed to its weakening credit profile.

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Actual Earned Return on Equity ^(a)						
		Year-	ending			
	<u>Mar-09</u>	2008	2007			
Distribution ^(b)	5.54%	6.26%	8.70%			
Total Company	8.78%	8.99%	8.41%			
Rate Base:						
Distribution	739,675					
Total Company 1,218,244						
	60.7%					

a. From Form F-1 filed with the New Hampshire PUC May 19, 2009 b. In Docket No. DE 06-028, PSNH distribution was allowed a 9.67% return on equity. In the prior distribution docket a return on equity was not stated.

4 Because of the relative size of PSNH's distribution rate base to its total assets, its low

allowed and earned ROE is a driver of the Company's earnings and credit metrics. This

6 proceeding affords the Commission an opportunity to stop PSNH's deteriorating credit

7 situation by not only setting a more appropriate allowed ROE but, of equal importance,

by setting distribution rates at a level that will permit PSNH a realistic opportunity to
 earn that allowed return going forward. In addition, as discussed in the next section, it is
 important that PSNH's ratemaking capital structure be strengthened.

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V. <u>CAPITAL STRUCTURE</u>

5 Q. What is the Company's proposed capital structure?

A. PSNH should continue to target a capital structure of 45 percent equity and 55 percent
debt using the rating agency (S&P) methodology. This rating agency target is consistent
with PSNH peers' actual rating agency capital structures. In Attachment GJE – 2 <u>Capital</u>
<u>Structure</u>, I provide the 2007 and 2008 actual S&P capital structures for each of the peer
companies.

11 Q. Why is it appropriate for PSNH to set a target using the rating agency

12 methodology?

A. The principal reason is that the rating agency capital structure is highly influential in the
 financial markets. It exerts a strong influence over bond ratings, marketability of debt
 securities, and ultimately PSNH's cost of capital.

Q. How does the rating agency capital structure differ from the ratemaking capital
 structure?

A. The primary difference between the two capital structures is that the rating agencies include all contractual obligation that have a claim to a company's current and future cash flows, not just traditional debt (i.e., bonds). Leases are a classic example of that type of contractual obligation, sometime referred to as off-balance sheet debt. The rating agencies "impute" debt for such obligations. Consequently, the rating agency capital structures will typically have a higher percentage of debt than ratemaking capital
 structures. The differences between the two capital structures are discussed in more
 detail in Attachment GJE - 2 <u>Capital Structure</u>. Significantly, rating agencies now impute
 debt for Asset Retirement Obligations and for Unfunded Pension and Post Retirement
 Obligations, which can have a significant effect on rating agency capital structure.

6 Q. Does PSNH manage its capital structure to meet the rating agency target?

A. No. PSNH must manage to its allowed ratemaking capital structure. As explained more
fully below, additional equity above the allowed level for ratemaking purposes would
lower PSNH's actual earned ROE because, in effect, it would be earning a zero return on
the incremental equity.

11 Q. How does PSNH manage to its ratemaking capital structure?

Although PSNH uses internal cash flow to finance a portion of its annual investment,²¹ it 12 A. is typical for PSNH to need additional capital over and above its internal cash flow. This 13 "external" capital requirement is met with a combination of new debt issuances and new 14 equity contributions from PSNH's parent, Northeast Utilities ("NU"). The relative 15 amounts of new debt and new equity are designed to maintain the ratemaking capital 16 structure at the allowed level. The table below shows that, as a result of PSNH's 17 increasing capital expenditures and weak distribution earnings, NU has found it necessary 18 to contribute increasing amounts of equity capital to PSNH to maintain the ratemaking 19 20 structure.

	Year-to-Date		
	<u>2009</u>	<u>2008</u>	<u>2007</u>
NU Capital Contributions (SM)	67.3	75.6	44.2

²¹ PSNH budgets 60 percent of annual earnings as a dividend to its parent, with the remainder of funds from operations utilized to meet PSNH's capital requirements.

- NU's equity contributions have been instrumental in allowing PSNH to maintain its credit rating in the face of weakening cash flow credit ratios.
- Q. You stated earlier that rating agencies now impute debt for Unfunded Pension and
 Post Retirement Obligations and Asset Retirement Obligations. How has that
 affected the Company's requested capital structure?
- A. In the last rate case PSNH requested a ratemaking capital structure of 48.13 percent
 equity and 51.87 percent long-term debt in order to meet its rating agency capital
 structure target of 45 percent equity and 55 percent debt.²² In order to maintain the same
 rating agency capital structure target, PSNH's ratemaking capital structure will now need
 to be set at 51.11 percent equity and 48.88 percent debt. The calculations are shown in
 GJE 2 <u>Capital Structure</u>.

12 Q. Why didn't NU provide more equity to PSNH in order to attain the target rating

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agency capital structure?

- A. As noted above, if NU had contributed equity capital to PSNH above the level allowed
- 15 for ratemaking purposes in order to attain its target rating agency capital structure, PSNH
- 16 would have earned a zero percent return on that incremental equity investment. As
- 17 discussed above, PSNH's earned ROE is already too low. Therefore, if NU had
- 18 contributed more equity to PSNH over the allowed capital structure, PSNH's earned ROE

²² The current allowed ratemaking capital structure, which was negotiated and included in the May 2007 settlement, assumes 1.18 percent of rate base is funded with short-term debt. This is inconsistent with industry practice and the Company disagrees with the inclusion. Short-term debt is discussed in more detail in Attachment GJE -2 Capital Structure.

1	would have been even lower. Further, NU has a fiduciary responsibility to its equity
2	investors and such an incremental equity investment with no return would be very
3	difficult to justify.

4 (Э.	How does NU	obtain the e	ouity capital that	it periodically	y contributes to PSNH?
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- A. In order for NU to make equity contributions to PSNH and its other operating companies,
 NU periodically raises its own equity capital with common stock issuances. For
 example, in March 20, 2009, NU sold 18.975 million new shares of common stock to the
 public at a price of \$20.20. After expenses NU netted \$370.8 million, which it has or will
 invest in its operating companies.
- 10 Q. Are other utilities requesting an increase in the equity percent of their ratemaking
- 11 capital structure as a result of imputed debt for Unfunded Pension and Post
- 12 Retirement Obligations and Asset Retirement Obligations?
- 13 A. Yes. I asked our bankers at Citi Bank to research that precise question. John D. Clapp,
- 14 Managing Director, Global Power Sector, Citi Investment Banking provided the
- 15 following summary of utility equity market activity:

... there are a number of utilities that have requested and received higher 16 equity percentages in relation to their overall capital structure. Overall we 17 have seen a growing number of utilities issuing equity in the capital markets 18 over the past 6 months. These issuances have often been driven by the need 19 to rebalance the utility's capital structure to preserve the current rating and 20 alleviate concerns over potential downgrades typically due to a combination 21 of: 1) declining revenues and 2) significant near-term capex requirements. In 22 addition to showing prudence given market uncertainty, these actions also 23 recognize that companies with stronger balance sheets/liquidity have more 24 25 consistent access to all forms of capital.

1 2	certain utilities are going beyond a rebalancing their cap structure and deleveraging to varying degrees. A search of the supporting testimony
2	showed that in at least two cases (TECO and OGE, attached) utilities raised
4	concerns about the economy, and in particular the need to reduce debt interest
5	expenses in a time of revenue uncertainty as a major rationale behind their
6	request for a larger equity component in the cap structure. ²³
7	Citi Bank also provided a list of 13 electric utilities that have or are seeking regulatory
8	authority to increase the equity component of their ratemaking capital structure. I have
9	provided that list in GJE - 2 Capital Structure. The average ratemaking equity percentage
10	being requested is 51.96 percent.

Do the challenging financial market conditions discussed above have any impact on

11 12 Q.

the appropriate capital structure for PSNH?

Yes. The current environment poses significant challenges with respect to a utility's 13 A. ability to raise capital on reasonable terms. For PSNH these concerns are magnified by 14 the fact that its credit metrics are weakening. Fitch recently observed that in current 15 credit markets, "flight to quality is selective within the (utility) sector, favoring 16 companies at higher rating levels."²⁴ Ideally, this would be a good time to strengthen 17 PSNH's rating agency capital structure target. I have not made that recommendation, 18 however, because the ratemaking capital structure already needs to be strengthened in 19 this proceeding merely to maintain the current rating agency capital structure target. If 20 21 the challenging financial market conditions continue, the Company will likely propose to strengthen its rating agency capital in a future proceeding. 22

²³ Email from John Clapp at Citi Bank to G,J. Eckenroth dated May 22, 2009

²⁴ Fitch Ratings Ltd., "U.S. Utilities, Power and Gas 2009 Outlook," Global Power North America Special Report (Dec. 22, 2008).

1 VI. <u>COST OF CAPITAL</u>

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a. <u>Cost of PSNH's Long-Term Debt</u>

3 Q. Please summarize your Long-Term Debt recommendation.

A. The table below shows PSNH's outstanding long-term debt, which consists of five series
of pollution control revenue bonds and four series of first mortgage bonds, plus a new
first mortgage bond to be issued in 2009. The table shows the total principal amount of
each issue, gross financings costs and the net proceeds or cash available to fund rate base.
The table also shows the total amortized issuance costs and the net cash available to fund
rate base in 2009.

				Total	
(million \$)	А	t Offering Dat	te	Amortized	
		Financing	Net	Financing	Net
	Principal	Costs	Proceeds	Costs	Outstanding
Pollution Co	ontrol Revenue	Bonds			
Series A	89,250	5,781	83,469	2,025	85,494
Series B	89,250	7,124	82,126	2,280	84,406
Series C	108,985	7,787	101,198	2,517	103,715
Series D	75000	4,149	70,851	3,091	73,942
Series E	44,800	<u>3,088</u>	<u>41,712</u>	<u>2,479</u>	<u>44,191</u>
	407,285	27,929	379,356	12,392	391,748
<u>First Mortga</u>	age Bonds				
Series L	50,000	549	49,451	194	49,645
Series M	50,000	694	49,306	74	49,380
Series N	70,000	607	69,393	-166	69,227
Series O	110,000	1,465	<u>108,535</u>	-1,013	<u>107,522</u>
	280,000	3,315	276,685	-911	275,774
	687,285		656,041	11,481	667,522
<u>New Bond</u>	150,000	1,296	148,704	0	148,704
	837,285		804,745	11,481	816,226

The table below shows the calculation of the total annual carrying costs. The annual carrying costs are the sum of the interest payment plus the amortization of financing costs.

				Annual	
(million \$)				Amortization	Total
	Interest			of Financing (Carrying
	Rate	Principal	Interest	Costs	Costs
Pollution Co	ntrol Reve	enue Bonds			
Series A	0.40%	89,250	357	413	770
Series B	4.75%	89,250	4,239	502	4,741
Series C	5.45%	108,985	5,940	427	6,367
Series D	6.00%	75000	4,500	86	4,586
Series E	6.00%	<u>44,800</u>	<u>2,688</u>	49	<u>2,737</u>
		407,285	17,724	1,477	19,201
<u>First Mortga</u>	<u>ge Bonds</u>				
Series L	5.25%	50,000	2,625	63	2,688
Series M	5.60%	50,000	2,800	23	2,823
Series N	6.15%	70,000	4,305	89	4,394
Series O	6.00%	<u>110,000</u>	<u>6,600</u>	266	<u>6,866</u>
		280,000	16,330	441	16,771
		687,285	34,054	1,918	35,972
<u>New Bond</u>	6.44%	150,000	9,660	130	9,790
		837,285	43,714	2,048	45,762

The 5.61 percent weighted cost of debt is calculated by dividing the Total Carrying Costs

by the Net Outstanding.

Total		Weighted
Carrying	Net	Cost of
<u>Costs</u>	Outstanding	<u>Debt</u>
45,762	816,226	5.607%

1

Q. Please discuss why PSNH must issue a new bond in 2009?

PSNH needs additional long-term capital to fund its construction program and for general 2 A. working capital needs. In between bond issuances PSNH borrows short-term from the 3 NU System Money Pool and its Revolving Credit Facility on a temporary basis. In the 4 longer term, sound financial management requires using long-term financing to finance 5 long-term assets. Therefore, it is necessary to replace the short-term financing with long-6 term debt when the amount reaches a level that permits PSNH to issue a bond in an 7 economically efficient manner. PSNH's financing plan contemplates accessing the 8 capital markets to issue long-term debt whenever short-term debt consistently exceeds the 9 \$125 to \$140 million range. The Company filed an application dated February 20, 2009 10 with the Commission to issue long-term debt in Docket No. DE09-033. The Company's 11 12 2009 financing plan anticipated the issuance of a ten-year first mortgage bond as early as the second quarter of this year.²⁵ The 2009 financing plan incorporated into the 2009 13 budget assumed an all-in interest rate of 6.44 percent for the issuance of a new ten-year 14 first mortgage bond.²⁶ 15

16

17

Q. What is the purpose of your ROE analysis?

b. Return on PSNH's Common Equity

A. The purpose of my analysis is to develop and support a recommendation that meets the
applicable legal and economic standards, which hold that a utility and its investors should

²⁵ After receipt of a financing order from the Commission, the Company will move expeditiously to issue.

²⁶ The 6.44 percent all-in rate was based on November 2008 market data that required a 10-yer credit spread of 369 basis points over the yield on a ten-year treasury bond.

be afforded an opportunity to earn a return commensurate with returns they could expect to achieve on investments of similar risks.²⁷

- Q. 3 Is there one methodology that can be used to precisely determine the proper ROE for a utility such as PSNH? 4 5 A. No. When measuring equity costs, which essentially deal with the measurement of 6 investor expectations, no one single methodology provides a sufficiently reliable result. The Society of Utility and Regulatory Analysts supports using a multiplicity of methods 7 8 and, as a member, I have complied with their recommendation. I have used the three 9 most accepted valuation models: a Discounted Cash Flow Model ("DCF"), the Capital 10 Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") and a Risk Premium Model ("RPM").
- 11 Q. How did you develop your recommendation?

1

2

12 A. Estimating the cost of equity capital involves theoretical and empirical components. The theoretical component relies on the standard financial literature to develop cost of capital 13 14 models that are consistent with what we know and observe about the way the financial 15 markets work. Each of the accepted cost of capital models results from theoretical 16 investigations. The empirical component includes the collection of the data to be used with the theoretical cost of capital methods. The most important empirical considerations 17 are to use data that are (1) consistent with the theoretical models employed, (2) timely and 18 19 (3) unbiased. It is also important that the calculations made with the empirical data be 20 reliable and stable and not sensitive to minor or judgmental changes.

²⁷ The reference is to the *Bluefield* and *Hope* U.S. Supreme Court cases that collectively reflect the economic criteria encompassed in the "opportunity cost" principle.

1		i. Discounted Cash Flow Method
2	Q.	Please explain the DCF Model?
3	А.	Discounted cash flow valuation calculates the value of an asset as the present value of the
4		expected future cash flows to be earned by the holder of the asset. Financial theory
5		clearly establishes that the DCF is the best way to establish the value of an asset if the
6		future cash flows can be determined accurately. There are significant challenges to
7		overcome when applying the DCF to common stocks, however, because the cash flows
8		on common stock are not known.
9		The simplest DCF model for valuing equity is the dividend discount model, which
10		determines the value of a stock by calculating the present value of all dividends expected
11		to be paid to holders of the stock. This approach is not very operational, as it requires an
12		estimation of an infinite stream of dividends.
13		A simplified version of the DCF model was published by Professor Myron
14		Gordon a half century ago and has been in use ever since. While Professor
15		Gordon's model is frequently referred to as "the" DCF model, it would be more
16		accurate to characterize it as "a form of" the DCF model that requires the
17		acceptance of several strict assumptions. The most extreme of these assumptions
18		is that the earnings and dividends of a company will grow at a constant rate over
19		the company's life. The theoretical underpinnings of the DCF model are
20		discussed in more detail in Attachment GJE - 3 Discounted Cash Flow Model.

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)	1		The Gordon version of the DCF model sets the following formula:
	2		$P_0 = D_0 x (1+g) / (K_e - g)$ where:
	3		$P_0 = Current stock price$
	4		$D_0 =$ Actual dividends in the last four quarters
	5		$K_e =$ Investors' required return or equity cost of capital
6 g = Estimated annual earnings growth rate			g = Estimated annual earnings growth rate
	7		Solving the equation for K_{e} the cost of equity, algebraically, the standard DCF
	8		formulation widely used in regulatory proceeding is obtained.
	9		$K_e = (D_0 x (1+g) / P_0) + g$
	10		This formula effectively states that the equity investors' required return can be estimated
	11		as the sum of an expected dividend yield plus an expected growth rate.
x			
y de la construcción de la construc	12	Q.	The DCF model requires data that is only available for publicly-traded companies.
)	12 13	Q.	The DCF model requires data that is only available for publicly-traded companies. Given that PSNH is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NU, not a publicly-traded stock,
		Q.	
	13	Q. A.	Given that PSNH is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NU, not a publicly-traded stock,
	13 14		Given that PSNH is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NU, not a publicly-traded stock, how did you proceed?
	13 14 15		Given that PSNH is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NU, not a publicly-traded stock, how did you proceed? When dealing with a company that is not publicly traded, it is customary when using this
	13 14 15 16		Given that PSNH is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NU, not a publicly-traded stock, how did you proceed? When dealing with a company that is not publicly traded, it is customary when using this DCF model to utilize a group of publicly-traded companies with similar financial and
	13 14 15 16 17		Given that PSNH is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NU, not a publicly-traded stock, how did you proceed? When dealing with a company that is not publicly traded, it is customary when using this DCF model to utilize a group of publicly-traded companies with similar financial and operational characteristics as the firm being analyzed. That group of companies is known
	 13 14 15 16 17 18 		Given that PSNH is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NU, not a publicly-traded stock, how did you proceed? When dealing with a company that is not publicly traded, it is customary when using this DCF model to utilize a group of publicly-traded companies with similar financial and operational characteristics as the firm being analyzed. That group of companies is known as the proxy group. In keeping with my past practice, I developed a proxy group that
	 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 		Given that PSNH is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NU, not a publicly-traded stock, how did you proceed? When dealing with a company that is not publicly traded, it is customary when using this DCF model to utilize a group of publicly-traded companies with similar financial and operational characteristics as the firm being analyzed. That group of companies is known as the proxy group. In keeping with my past practice, I developed a proxy group that institutional investors view as similar to PSNH with the assistance of Morgan Stanley
	 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 		Given that PSNH is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NU, not a publicly-traded stock, how did you proceed? When dealing with a company that is not publicly traded, it is customary when using this DCF model to utilize a group of publicly-traded companies with similar financial and operational characteristics as the firm being analyzed. That group of companies is known as the proxy group. In keeping with my past practice, I developed a proxy group that institutional investors view as similar to PSNH with the assistance of Morgan Stanley (the "Institutional Investor" proxy group). In order to test the sensitivity of my results to

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Q. The DCF model requires a stock price, dividend and a dividend yield. How did you develop those inputs?

The dividend yield is simply the annual dividend divided by a stock price. For the 3 A. dividend, I used the sum of the actual last four quarterly dividends paid by each of the 57 4 companies in my data base. For the stock price, I averaged the high and low stock price 5 in each month and then calculated an average price for period for each of the companies 6 in the data base. Because of the steady decline in stock prices since September 2008, I 7 calculated the dividend yield using six, three and one-month average stock prices. The 8 calculation of dividends, average stock prices and yield is discussed in more detail in 9 10 Attachment GJE - 3 Discounted Cash Flow Model.

The DCF model requires a long-term growth rate. How did you develop it? **Q**. 11 The most challenging part of the DCF methodology is estimating the growth rate. In 12 Α. their 2008 MBA text, Michaels C. Ehrhardt and Eugene F. Brigham's include a section 13 entitled "Evaluating the Methods for Estimating Growth." The authors conclude that 14 "studies have shown that analysts' forecast usually represent the best source of growth 15 rate data for the DCF cost of capital estimations."²⁸ That conclusion is consistent with 16 my view and my past practice. Therefore, I used the consensus or average of publicly 17 available growth rates. In particular, I utilized the growth rates, published by Value Line, 18 Yahoo Finance, Zacks Investment Services, SNL, and Institutional Brokers Estimate 19 System ("I/B/E/S"). My growth rate is the simple average of those five growth rates. In 20 Attachment GJE - 3 Discounted Cash Flow Model, I discuss the use of analyst growth 21 rates in more detail and present each of the growth rates that I utilized. 22

²⁸ M.C. Ehrhardt, E. F. Brigham, <u>Corporate Finance, A Focused Approached</u>, South-Western Cengage Leaning, 2008, page 302.

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Q. On which of your proxy groups have you based your recommendation?

- A. In keeping with my past practice, I base my recommendation on the Institutional Investor
 proxy group. However, as shown in Attachment GJE 3 <u>Discounted Cash Flow Model</u>,
 using other proxy groups would tend to increase my ROE calculations.
- 5 The details for each company in the Institutional Investor proxy group are presented 6 below. The range of ROEs is from 11.96 percent to 12.32 percent, depending on the 7 time-period for calculating the stock price.

		Institutional Investor - PSNH Proxy			
			Average Stock F	•	
		6 month	3 months	1 month	
		ROE	ROE	ROE	
		Adj Yield	Adj Yield	Adj Yield	
		plus	plus	plus	
		Growth Rate	Growth Rate	Growth Rate	
1	ALLETE	10.35%	10.91%	10.74%	
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	11.75%	12.33%	12.28%	
3	Amer. Elec. Power	10.11%	10.71%	10.75%	
4	Avista Corp.	10.78%	11.35%	10.99%	
5	CH Energy Group	7.88%	8.05%	8.08%	
6	Cleco Corp.	16.70%	16.75%	16.88%	
7	Consol. Edison	8.86%	9.05%	9.18%	
8	DPL Inc.	13.24%	13.17%	13.18%	
9	DTE Energy Company	11.31%	11.95%	11.43%	
10	Empire Dist. Elec.	16.00%	16.66%	16.10%	
11	IDACORP, Inc.	9.80%	10.32%	10.29%	
12	Northeast Utilities	12.28%	12.54%	12.55%	
13	Northwestern Corporation	16.13%	16.35%	16.18%	
14	NSTAR	11.63%	11.89%	11.78%	
15	PG&E Corp.	11.39%	11.39%	11.51%	
16	Pinnacle West Capital	12.00%	12.70%	12.48%	
17	Portland General	12.37%	12.56%	12.30%	
18	Progress Energy	12.48%	12.85%	12.78%	
19	Southern Co.	10.83%	11.33%	11.48%	
20	TECO Holding Corp.	15.11%	15.39%	14.88%	
21	UIL Holding Company	11.58%	12.44%	12.25%	
22	Westar Energy	10.85%	11.25%	11.12%	
23	Wisconsin Energy	11.87%	11.99%	12.06%	
24	Xcel Energy Inc.	11.77%	11.82%	11.85%	
	0.		<u></u>		
	average	11.96%	12.32%	12.21%	

Some of my misgivings with the DCF model are illustrated by the table above. For example, the range of investor returns for a group of companies with similar financial and operational companies is too large: CH Energy Group 7.9 percent to Cleco Corp 16.8 percent. Further, several low ROEs clearly do not make economic sense, as investors are not being compensated for accepting the incremental risk of equity risk over debt with a higher return. Conversely, several of the high numbers are too generous; investors would quickly eliminate such outliers through arbitrage.²⁹

8 Q. How did you correct for this shortcoming of the DCF model?

A. Consistent with my past practice, I apply an Acceptance Criterion to the ROE for each
company in the Institutional Investor proxy group. My Acceptance Criterion requires
that the company's calculated ROE must fall within a range of reasonableness. After
applying the Acceptance Criterion, the range of ROEs is reduced from 11.96 percent to
12.32 percent to 11.45 to 11.86 percent. My Acceptance Criterion and its impact on the
proxy group are discussed in GJE - 3 <u>Discounted Cash Flow Model</u>.³⁰

		Acceptance Criterion						
		Return	Return on Equity Institutional Investor Proxy Group					
			Based on A	Average Sto	ck Prices of:			
		<u>Six Mo</u>	Six Month Price Three Month Price			One Mo	One Month Price	
		ROE	<u>Accept</u>	ROE	Accept	ROE	Accept	
Per-accepten	ce average	11.96%		12.32%		12.21%		
Post-accepter	nce average		11.66%		11.86%		11.45%	
	ROE over Long	-Term Debt	3.40%		3.57%		3.39%	

²⁹ Arbitrage is the simultaneous purchase and sale of an asset in order to profit from a difference in the price. It is a trade that profits by exploiting price or return differences of identical or similar financial instruments.

 $^{^{30}}$ For the cost of debt, I used the average monthly cost of a Baa bond yield as published by the Federal Reserve in publication H.15.

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Q.

Would you make any additional adjustment to the average DCF ROE?

Yes. I would adjust for flotation costs. On March 20, 2009, NU sold new common 2 A. equity. The price paid by investors was \$20.20 per share but NU received only \$19.54 3 per share. The \$.6622 per share (or 3.28 percent) difference was the cost to issue the new 4 shares of common stock. In order for NU to earn the ROE required by investors based on 5 NU's \$20.20 share price, NU must earn a higher return on the \$19.54 per share to that 6 NU actually receives. The flotation cost adjustment is discussed in more detail, along 7 with the supporting calculations, in Attachment GJE - 3 Discounted Cash Flow Model. A 8 20 basis point issuance cost adjustment to the ROEs is required to earn the investors' 9 required return on the net proceeds available to the company. 10

11

Q. Please summarize your DCF analysis.

A. Using my proxy group and Acceptance Criterion, and adjusting for flotation costs, my
 DCF analysis supports an ROE in the 11.65 percent to 12.06 percent range.

14

ii. Capital Asset Pricing Models ("CAPM" and "ECAPM")

15 Q. Please describe the CAPM.

The CAPM is a widely-referenced method for estimating the cost of equity both among 16 A. academicians and professional practitioners. As with other risk premium-based models, 17 the CAPM recognizes that risk-averse investors demand higher returns for assuming 18 additional risk and that higher-risk securities are therefore priced to yield higher expected 19 returns than lower-risk securities. The CAPM goes one step further by providing a 20 formal risk-return relationship that quantifies the risk premium required for bearing 21 incremental risk in the context of a highly diversified portfolio. The CAPM is 22 mathematically expressed as: 23

1	$K_e = R_f + Beta (R_m - R_f)$
2	where:
3	$K_e = investors$ required return or equity cost of capital
4	$R_f = risk$ free rate of return
5	Beta = measure of risk
6	R_m = market rate of return
7	$R_m - R_f = market risk premium$
8	
9	As discussed below, the CAPM has been demonstrated to have a key bias
10	Empirical CAPM ("ECAPM") was developed to correct that bias.

How did you choose a risk free rate of return? Q. 11

12	А.	The ideal estimate for the risk-free rate should have a term to maturity equal to the
13		security being analyzed and the maturity of the assets being financed. Because common
14		stock has a perpetual life, cash flows to equity investors last indefinitely, regardless of an
15		individual investor's holding period. Moreover, most utility assets have very long-term
16		useful lives. Therefore, the best available proxy for the risk-free rate in the CAPM is the
17		return on the longest term Treasury bond that is traded. At present, the longest possible
18		term on a government bond is the yield on 30-year Treasury bonds. ³¹ Therefore, I have
19		used the yield on 30-year Treasury bonds in implementing the CAPM. In Attachment
20		GJE - 4 CAPM, I have provided detail on the 30-year Treasury bond yield. The yield has
21		been slowly but steadily rising; ³² the average yield in December 2008 was 2.87 percent
22		and in May 2009 the average yield was 4.23 percent. I have used an extremely
23		conservative 4 percent as the risk-free rate.

and the

³¹ While the return on Treasury Bills is sometimes used as the risk-free rate, Treasury Bills are not an ideal choice. Investors in common stocks (which do not expire or mature) have an investment horizon far in excess of Treasury Bills. An appropriate risk-free rate for valuing common stocks must have a long term to maturity.

³² See Yahoo Finance ^TYX 30-yr Treasury bond

Q. Please explain Beta.

2	А.	The beta coefficient is the measure of risk used in the CAPM. Under the CAPM view,
3		total risk (the variability of returns) of an investment consists of two parts: systematic risk
4		and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk is unavoidable since it affects all assets in the
5		economy to some degree. In contrast, unsystematic risk is due to the unique
6		circumstances of a specific asset. The impact of unsystematic risk can be greatly reduced
7		through diversification. ³³ The CAPM theorizes that since unsystematic risk can be
8		largely avoided through diversification; it is not rewarded with a risk premium.
9		Conversely, since systematic risk cannot be avoided, it is rewarded with a risk premium.

10 The beta coefficient measures the average change in a security's (stock) return relative to 11 the market.³⁴ By the design of the CAPM model, the overall market always has a beta of 12 1.0. A beta of greater than one indicates that a company is more risky than the market as 13 a whole; a beta of less than one means that the company is less risky than the market. 14 There is a well-known tendency of beta to gradually migrate toward the average beta of 15 1.0 over time, also known as regression toward the mean.³⁵ Therefore, in estimating 16 betas, it is necessary to adjust for this tendency. I have utilized the betas published by

³³ Diversification is the (calculated) spreading of investments over a number of different asset classes, sectors, countries. This provides a cushion, since different asset classes, sectors, or countries seldom move in the same direction.

³⁴ Absolute estimates of beta vary when different computational methods are used. The return data, the time period used, its duration, the choice of a market index and whether annual, monthly or weekly return figures are used will influence the final result.

³⁵ See www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regression_toward_the_mean

Value Line, which have been adjusted for this movement of betas toward 1.0.³⁶ I have
 used a conservative beta of .70. A more detailed discussion of beta is provided in
 Attachment GJE - 4 <u>CAPM</u>.

4 Q. How did you determine the Market Risk Premium?

The market risk premium ("MRP") is the compensation in excess of the return on a risk-5 A. free asset that investors require for the additional market risk they bear. The MRP is of 6 critical importance in the CAPM given the direct relationship between it and the expected 7 ROE. The MRP is forward-looking, however, and not directly observable. I have 8 traditionally estimated the MRP using historical returns. However, historical equity risk 9 10 premiums are not indicative of equity investors' required returns to induce them to buy or hold stocks at this time. As discussed above under Current Market Conditions, with the 11 risk premiums for corporate bonds at historic highs, the equity risk premium must also be 12 13 higher than normal in order to compensate investors for the higher risk of investing in 14 equity rather than debt.

To capture the current high level of uncertainty in investor future expectations, with the assistance of Barclays Capital, I developed a DCF of the S&P 500 to calculate the expected return on the market.

In Attachment GJE – 4 <u>CAPM</u>, I discuss and present the calculation of the S&P 500
 expected return in more detail. Combining a forward S&P 500 dividend yield of 3.75
 percent with an expected long-term S&P 500 growth rate of 9.74 percent results in a

³⁶ Per www.valueline.com, "[t]he 'Beta coefficient' is derived from a regression analysis of the relationship between weekly percentage changes in the price of a stock and weekly percentage changes in the NYSE Index over a period of five years. The Betas are adjusted for their long-term tendency to converge toward 1.00."

- 13.49 percent long-term expected S&P 500 market return. The market return less the
 4.00 percent 30-year treasury yield provides a market risk premium of 9.49 percent.
- Q. What is the result of your CAPM before correcting for the biases to which you
 referred above?
 A. Based on the inputs discussed above the Traditional CAPM formula results in a ROE of
 10.64 percent.

 $\frac{\text{Roe}}{\text{ROE}} = \frac{\text{Rate}}{\text{Rate}} + \frac{(\text{Beta x MRP})}{0.70 \text{ x } 9.49\%}$ 10.64% = 4.00% + 6.64%

Q. Please describe the biases in the CAPM to which you referred. 7 A consistent finding of empirical studies of the CAPM show that there is a discrepancy 8 Α. between the risk-return tradeoff predicted by the CAPM and the risk-return tradeoff 9 actually observed. Specifically, these empirical findings show that low beta stocks have 10 higher rates of return than predicted by the model. This finding has given rise to the 11 "Empirical CAPM" or ECAPM, which is designed to correct this bias. The ECAPM 12 13 corrects the ROE to 10.79 percent as follows. ECAPM = (30 yr Treasury + Alpha) [Beta x (Risk Premium - Alpha)] +0.50% 10.79% 4.00% + 0.50% 0.70 х 9.49% _

14

15

I discuss the need for and computation of the ECAPM adjustment in more detail in Attachment GJE – 4 <u>CAPM</u>.

1

Q.

What other adjustments should be made to the CAPM/ ECAPM?

One of the discoveries of modern finance is that of a relationship between company size 2 Α. and return. The relationship cuts across the entire spectrum of size but is most evident 3 among smaller companies, including electric utilities. The CAPM does not account for 4 size differentials across companies and therefore understates the cost of equity for small 5 6 companies. If PSNH were a stand-alone publicly trade company, investors would be expected to earn at least an additional 74 basis points, which would increase the ECAPM 7 recommendation to 11.53 percent. I discuss the size premium in more detail in 8 9 Attachment GJE – 4 CAPM.

Q. Are you proposing an adjustment for issuance cost to the CAPM as you did to your DCF model?

Yes. In GJE - 4 CAPM, I provide a numerical example of the need for an issuance cost 12 Α. adjustment. My example is based on March 2009 sale of NU common stock. Investors 13 paid \$20.20 for each share of NU stock. If an investor purchased the stock with an 14 15 expectation of earning annually 11 percent, then they expected to receive on average annually \$2.22 (20.20 x .11). However, after paying issuance expenses, NU received 16 only \$19.54 per share to invest. Consequently, NU must earn approximately 11.37 17 percent on the invested equity to meet the investor's \$2.22 expected returns. The 18 incremental 37 basis points should be added to the size-adjusted ECAPM of 11.53 19 percent to arrive at an 11.89 ROE.³⁷ 20

³⁷ The calculation of issuance costs using the CAPM method differs from the calculation using the DCF method.

	<u>Adjustments</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>
10.64%		
	0.15%	10.79%
	0.74%	11.53%
	0.37%	11.90%
	10.64%	10.64% 0.15% 0.74%

iii Risk Premium Model ("RPM")

2 **O**. Please discuss the development of an ROE using the Traditional RPM. 3 A. The traditional RPM is based on the fact that the return on debt is far easier to measure 4 than the required return on equity. The RPM takes the return on debt and adds an equity risk premium that is estimated from past market returns.³⁸ The RPM is conceptually 5 similar to CAPM, but was in wide use even before the CAPM was developed. Risk 6 7 premium analysis is commonly used by analysts, investors and expert witnesses and is 8 widespread in investment community reports.

9 The equity risk premium measures the additional risk required by investors for investing in equities rather than less risky assets, such as bonds. The RPM equation is as follows: 10

11	$K_e = D + R_p$
12	where:
13	$K_e = investor's$ required return or equity cost of capital
14	D = the cost (interest rate) of a company's debt
15	R_p = the investor's risk premium over a debt instrument

16

Q.

1

How is the equity risk premium estimated?

The equity risk premium is measured by the difference between equity returns and debt 17 A. returns over the very long term. Use of long-term data is essential. In the short term, 18 equity returns are strongly influenced by positive and negative surprises that result in 19

³⁸ Some have argued that historical returns are affected by investors' adjustments to relative taxation rates, and therefore not reflective of future expectations without tax adjustments. The core determinate of expected return is not taxability, but rather risk. Investors will examine the risk-return trade-off offered by various securities first and as a secondary matter the taxability issue.

unexpected outcomes. Therefore, actual equity returns may differ substantially from the
 returns required by equity investors. Over the long term, however, such surprises will
 tend to average out so that investors' required return and expected returns will converge.
 This will not be true for shorter time periods that do not provide an adequate sample size.
 Accordingly, I have used data from 1945 to 2008.

6

Q. How did you measure the cost of debt?

In the CAPM portion of my testimony, I explained why the appropriate cost of debt to 7 A. use when calculating an equity risk premium is the longest-term debt security that is 8 9 traded. For that reason, I have used the Moody's long-term bond yields for public utility bonds published in the Mergent Bond Record as the debt security from which to calculate 10 the equity risk premium. Moody's long-term corporate bond yields have been published 11 daily since 1929 in Mergent Bond Record. Mergent states in an explanatory footnote that 12 "(t) he bonds have maturities as close as possible to 30 years; they are dropped from the 13 list if their remaining life falls below 20 years." ³⁹ 14

15 **Q.**

How did you measure actual equity returns?

16 A. I used two data sources: the Moody's Electric Utility Index and the S&P Electric Utility
17 Index.

18 Q. What were the results of your analysis?

A. The results indicate a risk premium of 3.95 percent using the Moody's Electric Utility
 Index and 4.39 percent using the S&P Electric Utility Index. The average of these two
 estimates is an equity premium of 4.17 percent. As shown in the table below, the

³⁹ Mergent Bond Record May 2009 page 10

estimated current interest rate that PSNH would be required to pay on a newly issued 30 year bond is 8.28 percent. Adding a 4.17 percent risk premium to the 8.28 percent cost of
 debt results in a cost of equity for PSNH of 12.45 percent. The detailed calculations are
 presented and discussed in Attachment GJE - 5 <u>RPM</u>.

	PSNH	Equity	Cost
	Cost of Debt	Premium	of Equity
Treasury yield	4.00%		
BBB+ Credit Spread	<u>4.28%</u>		
	8.28%	4.17%	12.45%

5 VII. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

۰.

Please summarize your testimony. 6 Q. These are difficult economic times, both for businesses and their customers. The 7 A. recommendations in this testimony are designed to preserve PSNH's access to needed 8 funding on reasonable terms without unduly burdening customers at a time when PSNH's 9 credit metrics have been weakening to a degree that has provoked published comments 10 by the major rating agencies. 11 In attempting to find the appropriate balance, it is essential to keep in mind the clear 12 evidence that, at this time of economic stress, investors are extraordinarily risk averse. 13 This has resulted in historically high risk premiums on both debt and equity. These high 14 risk premiums have raised the cost of capital for all companies, including electric 15 16 utilities.

1	I have utilized three well-established methods to estimate the appropriate allowed ROE				
2	for PSNH. As shown in the table below, each of these methods supports an ROE of				
3	11.65 percent or higher.				
	Results	of ROE Cal	culation	<u>IS</u>	
	DCF	11.65%	to	12.06%	
	CAPM			11.90%	
	RPM			12.45%	
4	In deference to the economi	c challenges	that ma	my PSNH's customers are facing, and in	
5	light of recent regulatory de	cisions arou	nd the co	ountry, I am recommending only a 10.5	
6	percent allowed ROE. With	a 10.5 perce	ent ROE	E and my recommended capital structure,	
7	PSNH's appropriate WACC	is 8.11 perc	ent.		

Ratemaking Capital Struture and the Weighted Cost of Capital

		<u>Cost</u>		
	<u>Ratio</u>	Embedded	Weighted	
Long-Term Debt	48.88%	5.61%	2.74%	
Common Equity	51.12%	10.50%	<u>5.37%</u> 8.11%	

8 Q. Does that conclude your testimony?

9 A. Yes.

- ALE BARRA